NYT Monday, October 13, 2003
Now that David Kay's interim report on the search for weapons of mass destruction has deflated the Bush administration's claims about Iraq's chemical and nuclear weapons programs, the administration and Kay have turned instead to emphasizing the threat posed by Iraq's biological and missile programs. But the sketchy evidence cited publicly doesn't seem to depict any extraordinary threat - particularly not the kind of danger President George W. Bush depicted when he stressed the need for quick military action.
It is pretty clear that Iraq was attempting to develop ballistic missiles and cruise missiles with ranges exceeding the 90 miles, or 144 kilometers, allowed by UN strictures. A bigger question is whether that program was being contained by the work of UN weapons inspectors.
Investigators say they have recovered a test stand, engines and diagrams that were being used on the eve of the invasion in a program to convert an existing antiship missile into a cruise missile with a range of about 600 miles. Investigators have also found documents revealing high-level negotiations between Iraq and North Korea from December 1999 until last year for technology, machinery or equipment needed for a 780-mile-range surface-to-surface missile. Iraq actually advanced the Koreans $10 million toward the purchase but never got the technology, apparently because the Koreans feared detection with all the scrutiny then focused on Iraq.
This is certainly one more reminder of the dangers of North Korea's weapons programs. But the evidence does not really support Kay's bold assertion that had the American invasion not disrupted things, the Iraqis would have produced missiles that could hit targets 600 miles away, like Ankara or Cairo. Most of these Iraqi efforts occurred in the four years between the time UN inspectors left the country in late 1998 and returned in late 2002. But once the inspectors were back, their influence was particularly strong when it came to the missile program. One class of illegal missiles was already being destroyed.
Kay asserts that some of Iraq's missile work was going on under the noses of the inspectors. But he acknowledges that the Iraqis were so worried about being found out that they buried the test stand and engines that his team has now recovered. Equipment lying under tons of dirt does not pose a current threat. The fact that it was buried actually seems to support the argument that the missile programs may well have been contained by vigorous inspection, even without an invasion.
In the biological area, one administration claim seems farfetched. Kay reported, and Bush repeated, that the Iraqis had hidden a vial of live botulinum bacteria that could be used to produce biological weapons carrying large amounts of poison. Yet as Kay described it, the evidence came from an Iraqi scientist who said he had been asked in 1993 to hide multiple reference strains of biological organisms in his refrigerator.
Only one of those strains, the botulinum organism, was potentially relevant to biological weapons. It is hard to see how this cache, hidden so long ago for unclear reasons, is strong evidence of malign intent. Potentially more significant was the same scientist's contention that he had refused to hide a larger cache of anthrax germs, which Kay's team is now seeking to locate. That might plausibly be related to plans for restarting an anthrax weapons program. But it is hardly evidence of an immediate threat a decade later.
Kay had to back down from a claim that two mobile trailers found in Iraq were intended for making weapons. Now he says they were not well suited for that purpose. Both the president and Kay have focused instead on what they described as a clandestine laboratory network embedded in the Iraqi intelligence service.
These labs, some two dozen in all, were deemed suitable for biological and chemical research and were not reported to UN inspectors. But Kay's team has not yet determined what the labs were used for. At the least, he says, they provided a place where weapons-related expertise could be retained. If that is all they turn out to be, the find will simply confirm that Iraq intended to resume its work on illicit weapons in the future, not that it posed any immediate threat.
There is still a great deal of research needed before anyone can say flatly that Iraq did not have an active program for manufacturing weapons of mass destruction. But evidence seems to be pointing in a different direction than the one Kay and the administration are promoting. Senior Iraqi scientists have told investigators that the biological weapons program was dropped some time ago. Kay makes no mention of that in his statements.
If the administration wants Kay's findings to be treated with the seriousness they deserve, the investigators have to be much more forthcoming. Kay's brief unclassified version of his congressional testimony and his statements to the press are maddeningly short of specifics that would allow independent experts to evaluate the credibility of sources, the possibility of dissenting interpretations and the scale or stage of Iraq's efforts. That is unacceptable at a time when the fallibility of intelligence evaluations has become all too apparent.
Back to Start of Article Now that David Kay's interim report on the search for weapons of mass destruction has deflated the Bush administration's claims about Iraq's chemical and nuclear weapons programs, the administration and Kay have turned instead to emphasizing the threat posed by Iraq's biological and missile programs. But the sketchy evidence cited publicly doesn't seem to depict any extraordinary threat - particularly not the kind of danger President George W. Bush depicted when he stressed the need for quick military action.
It is pretty clear that Iraq was attempting to develop ballistic missiles and cruise missiles with ranges exceeding the 90 miles, or 144 kilometers, allowed by UN strictures. A bigger question is whether that program was being contained by the work of UN weapons inspectors.
Investigators say they have recovered a test stand, engines and diagrams that were being used on the eve of the invasion in a program to convert an existing antiship missile into a cruise missile with a range of about 600 miles. Investigators have also found documents revealing high-level negotiations between Iraq and North Korea from December 1999 until last year for technology, machinery or equipment needed for a 780-mile-range surface-to-surface missile. Iraq actually advanced the Koreans $10 million toward the purchase but never got the technology, apparently because the Koreans feared detection with all the scrutiny then focused on Iraq.
This is certainly one more reminder of the dangers of North Korea's weapons programs. But the evidence does not really support Kay's bold assertion that had the American invasion not disrupted things, the Iraqis would have produced missiles that could hit targets 600 miles away, like Ankara or Cairo. Most of these Iraqi efforts occurred in the four years between the time UN inspectors left the country in late 1998 and returned in late 2002. But once the inspectors were back, their influence was particularly strong when it came to the missile program. One class of illegal missiles was already being destroyed.
Kay asserts that some of Iraq's missile work was going on under the noses of the inspectors. But he acknowledges that the Iraqis were so worried about being found out that they buried the test stand and engines that his team has now recovered. Equipment lying under tons of dirt does not pose a current threat. The fact that it was buried actually seems to support the argument that the missile programs may well have been contained by vigorous inspection, even without an invasion.
In the biological area, one administration claim seems farfetched. Kay reported, and Bush repeated, that the Iraqis had hidden a vial of live botulinum bacteria that could be used to produce biological weapons carrying large amounts of poison. Yet as Kay described it, the evidence came from an Iraqi scientist who said he had been asked in 1993 to hide multiple reference strains of biological organisms in his refrigerator.
Only one of those strains, the botulinum organism, was potentially relevant to biological weapons. It is hard to see how this cache, hidden so long ago for unclear reasons, is strong evidence of malign intent. Potentially more significant was the same scientist's contention that he had refused to hide a larger cache of anthrax germs, which Kay's team is now seeking to locate. That might plausibly be related to plans for restarting an anthrax weapons program. But it is hardly evidence of an immediate threat a decade later.
Kay had to back down from a claim that two mobile trailers found in Iraq were intended for making weapons. Now he says they were not well suited for that purpose. Both the president and Kay have focused instead on what they described as a clandestine laboratory network embedded in the Iraqi intelligence service.
These labs, some two dozen in all, were deemed suitable for biological and chemical research and were not reported to UN inspectors. But Kay's team has not yet determined what the labs were used for. At the least, he says, they provided a place where weapons-related expertise could be retained. If that is all they turn out to be, the find will simply confirm that Iraq intended to resume its work on illicit weapons in the future, not that it posed any immediate threat.
There is still a great deal of research needed before anyone can say flatly that Iraq did not have an active program for manufacturing weapons of mass destruction. But evidence seems to be pointing in a different direction than the one Kay and the administration are promoting. Senior Iraqi scientists have told investigators that the biological weapons program was dropped some time ago. Kay makes no mention of that in his statements.
If the administration wants Kay's findings to be treated with the seriousness they deserve, the investigators have to be much more forthcoming. Kay's brief unclassified version of his congressional testimony and his statements to the press are maddeningly short of specifics that would allow independent experts to evaluate the credibility of sources, the possibility of dissenting interpretations and the scale or stage of Iraq's efforts. That is unacceptable at a time when the fallibility of intelligence evaluations has become all too apparent.
http://www.iht.com/articles/113362.html
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